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Abstract – Cybersecurity of industrial control system is a 
very complex and challenging research topic, due to the 
integration of these systems in national critical 
infrastructures. The control systems are now 
interconnected in industrial networks and frequently to 
the Internet. In this context they are becoming targets of 
various cyber attacks conducted by malicious people 
such as hackers, script kiddies, industrial spies and even 
foreign armies and intelligence agencies. In this paper 
the authors propose a way to model the most frequent 
attacker profiles and to estimate the success rate of an 
attack conducted in given conditions. The authors use a 
fuzzy approach for generating attacker profiles based on 
attacker attributes such as knowledge, technical 
resources and motivation. The attack success rate is 
obtained by using another fuzzy inference system that 
analyzes the attacker profile and system intrinsic 
characteristics. 
Keywords – cyberattack modeling; fuzzy system; 
attacker profile; attack success rate; 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Control systems are very complex technical 
structures composed not only by sensors, classical 
controllers and actuators, but also integrating devices 
with significant processing power and networking 
capabilities.  
Nowadays each industrial system integrates 
various automated control systems that are 
interconnected on industrial networks at the plant level 
and connected to the Internet for remote operation and 
monitoring.  These systems are frequently the target of 
various cyber attacks conducted by malicious persons 
from script kiddies and disgruntled employees to cyber 
terrorists and industrial spies. Since many of these 
industrial systems are components of national critical 
infrastructure, their security is a big challenge for 
industry, government and academia. 
The authors model the attacker profiles and 
estimate the attack success rate using a fuzzy 
approach. Before defining the fuzzy inference rules, 
we have to clarify some concepts related to control.  
Identification of threats and vulnerabilities is 
needed, when analyzing the control systems security 
[5]. Threats are synonym to attackers, even if they are 
identified as people or malicious hardware/software 
components. Threats are hard to characterize, since 
they have a high indetermination degree and can not 
be prevented. On the other side vulnerabilities are 
breaches which can be exploited by a threat. 
Vulnerabilities can be detected and controlled, the 
system administrator being able to protect the system 
against known issues [2]. 
The threats analyzed in this paper are attackers. 
Each attacker has a set of attributes such as knowledge 
of the target system, technical resources, motivation to 
conduct an attack against the system. All these 
characteristics allowed us to make some attacker 
profiles, as presented in [1] and in Section III of this 
paper. 
In the next sections the authors provide a detailed 
methodology for modelling the attacker profiles and 
for estimating the attack success rate by using a fuzzy 
inference approach. 
II. FUZZY INFERENCE SYSTEMS 
The fuzzy inference systems (FIS) are an 
appropriate solution to describe into a linguistic 
manner the behavior of a process [3]. The process 
behavior is usually described by a mathematical or 
linguistic model. The FIS approach is more suitable 
than conventional modelling methods in the case of 
nonlinear processes, if information about process 
nonlinearities is available [4].  
The architecture of a general fuzzy inference 
system is presented in the figure 1. A fuzzy inference 
system is formed by 5 functional units: 
- the fuzzification unit: at this phase (the premise 
stage) the crisp value of the input is transformed into a 
set of matching degrees to membership functions 
describing the fuzzified input; 
- the defuzzification unit: at this phase (the 
consequence stage) the fuzzy set resulted from rule 
inference mechanism is transformed into a crisp value; 
- the database unit: the storage unit for membership 
functions parameters for both input and output fuzzy 
variables (model’s tuning parameters); 
-  the rule base unit: the storage unit for the IF-
THEN rules that describe system behavior (Mamdani-
M or Takagi-Sugeno TS type);  
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- the decision block: the inference mechanism is 
applied to the existing rules. 
Figure 1. The architecture of a fuzzy inference system 
 The mathematical modelling of the process 
behavior usually begins with finding the proper 
membership functions for input and output variables 
(first set of tuning parameters of the model – the 
proper shape for membership functions: triangular, 
bell shaped, Gaussian, trapezoidal et al.). After 
choosing the proper shape, the tuning parameters for 
chosen membership functions are found using trial and 
error methods (second tuning parameters of the 
model). This phase is followed by the construction of 
the fuzzy rules (M or TS type). The IF-THEN rules are 
the result of observations and experience of an expert 
in process field. The last phase is applying the 
operations of inference to the fuzzy rules and then 
establishing the crisp output value and the modelling 
result. 
In the following sections is proposed a fuzzy 
approach on modelling the cyber attacks patterns on 
industrial control systems. In authors opinion the cyber 
attacks can be described with attributes such as 
attacker profile, protection degree of attacked unit, 
system vulnerabilities and restore costs (impact 
factor). 
III. MODELLING THE ATTACKER PROFILE 
The cyber attacks that happen in industrial control 
systems are conducted by different types of attackers. 
The “perpetrators” go from un-skilled “script kiddie” 
to experts “cyber warrior”.  
The authors experience suggests that an attacker 
profile can be associated to an attacker score, 
indicating the ability of an attacker to successfully 
conduct an attack.  
Each attacker can be characterized by at least three 
parameters: knowledge, technical resources and 
motivation [1]. These parameters are presented in the 
following paragraphs. 
Knowledge is an intrinsic attacker characteristic, 
that indicates his technical skills that can be used to 
initiate and conduct an attack. Also this parameter can 
show the awareness on the target system architecture 
and the existent countermeasures. A script kiddie, an 
Internet user that finds an exploit and tries to use it, 
has a very low knowledge on the target system; 
meanwhile an industrial spy or a disgruntled employee 
is aware of the system specifications, security 
measures and has much more chances to exploit a 
specific vulnerability than the common Internet user. 
Technical resources parameter is an attacker 
profile attribute that indicates the hardware and 
software resources that can be used in order to deploy 
a specific attack type. 
Motivation is an intrinsic attacker attribute that 
indicate the determination to conduct an attack on the 
system. Motivation is given by financial win, 
reputation, revenge.  This parameter is hard to quantify 
and is very dynamic. 
  These are the three inputs for the proposed FIS. 
The output is the attacker profile score. If three 
membership functions are used as granularity of model 
description for each input, it results in 27 fuzzy rules 
that describe attacker’s profile. Increasing the number 
of membership functions (MF) for each input 
generates a significant growth of fuzzy rules number 
(MF number of inputs), with little consequence on the 
quality of the model versus computational effort. This 
is the consequence of the importance in fuzzy 
modelling of the completeness, continuity and 
consistency of fuzzy rule base. In Table 1 are 
presented the most important features of proposed 
membership functions (trimf-triangular, trapmf - 
trapezoidal) for proposed inputs. 
The output is described by 5 triangular 
membership functions as depicted in figure 2.  
TABLE I.  INPUTS DESCRIPTION 
Input  
Membership functions 
Small Medium Big 
Resources 
trapfm trimf trapfm 
[-0.225 -
0.025 0.1 
0.5] 
[0.3 0.6 0.9] [0.7 0.9 1.06 1.26] 
Knowledge trimf trimf trimf [-0.4 0 0.5] [0 0.5 1] [0.5 1 1.4] 
Motivation 
trapfm trimf trapfm 
[-0.45 -0.05 
0.1 0.4] [0.2 0.5 0.8] 
[0.6 0.95 
1.05 1.45] 
 
The shapes and parameters for membership 
functions resulted from trial and error methods and 
authors experience in fuzzy modeling. The experience 
in attacker behavior is described by the 27 fuzzy rules 
(Mamdani type).  
 
Figure 2. Output of 5 triangular membership functions 
Attacker profiles can be generated by various 
combinations of the three parameters presented in the 
previous paragraphs. Each combination is possible, but 
in the literature and taking into account the authors 
experience we can define some well-established 
profiles: 
Input Output
Fuzzification
phase
Defuzzification
Phase
Decision block
Database Rule base
Knowledge base
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- Script kiddie is an unexperienced and 
unskilled attacker that found a security exploit 
and tries to use it in order to obtain reputation. 
This type of attacker has rarely success in 
targeting protected systems, even if they 
initiate the majority of attacks. 
- Hacker is a skilled attacker that initiates 
attacks for gaining reputation in his 
community. He may have good technical 
resource. Generally, he has little knowledge 
about the target system architecture. 
- Disgruntled employee has a very high level of 
knowledge about the system. May initiate very 
dangerous attacks from the interior of the 
industrial network. His motivation is medium 
and decreases over time. The main scope is to 
revenge against the employee. 
- Terrorists are now employing skilled people 
with a decent resources level available. They 
can work as individuals or as organized 
groups. Their motivation is for financial gain 
and for spreading terror and clutter in the 
society. They are targeting mainly critical 
systems. 
- Industrial spy tries to get access to 
confidential data or to sabotage the 
competition. They have very high knowledge 
and technical resources, being specialists in 
the field, and also a good financial gain 
motivation. 
- Cyber warrior is the most dangerous attacker. 
This attacker has the highest levels of 
knowledge, resources and motivation. They 
can initiate and sustain distributed attacks 
against many targets simultaneously. Their 
objective is to break the functioning or to 
destroy critical infrastructures. This kind of 
attackers are sustained by enemy countries in 
the context of electronic and information 
warfare.  
 
Table II offers some particular cases of attacker 
profiles and the corresponding main active rule. 
TABLE II.  PARTICULAR CASES OF KNOWN ATTACKERS 
Attacker 
type 
Main active rule 
No Res. Know. Motiv. Score 
Script 
kiddie 1 small small small 
very 
small 
Hacker 4 small medium small small 
Disgruntled 
employee 8 small big medium medium 
Terrorist 14 medium  medium medium medium 
Industrial 
spy 26 big big medium very big 
Cyber 
warrior 27 big big big very big 
 
The attacker profile is a function of three inputs 
and one output.  The resulted FIS shows that the major 
impact of determining the attacker score is associated 
to knowledge, followed by resources and motivation. 
For example, if motivation is medium, the attacker 
scores depend on resources and knowledge as in figure 
3.  
 
Figure 3. Attacker score in case of  medium motivation  
Furthermore, if resources levels are small, like in 
the case of disgruntled employee, the attacker score 
dependence on knowledge is presented in figure 4, 
with a nonlinear saturation shape. 
 
Figure 4. Digruntled employee - attacker profile score 
If resources level is big, like in the case of 
industrial spy, the attacker score dependence on 
knowledge is presented in figure 5.  
Figure 5. Industrial spy case – attacker profile score 
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If resources are medium, like in the case of 
terrorists, the dependence of attacker score is 
presented in figure 6 (again saturation shape). 
 
Figure 6. Terrorist – profile attacker score 
It is obvious that the attacker profile is proportional 
in a way with the knowledge. The dependence 
between profile score and knowledge are in the 
presented cases nonlinear increasing functions. Of 
particular interest are the extreme cases of script 
kiddie and cyber warrior.  
In the case of script kiddie or hacker, the 
motivation is small, and the resulted surface of costs 
depending on knowledge and resources is presented in 
figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Attacker profile score in case of  small motivation  
If resources are small (the case of script kiddie), 
the attacker score depending on knowledge are 
presented in figure 8 and if resources are medium (the 
case of hacker) the scores are presented in figure 9. 
 
Figure 8. Script kiddie - attacker profile score 
Both characteristics show almost linear behavior, 
only in the case of script kiddie there are two distinct 
portions with different proportional gains. 
 
Figure 9. Hacker case - attacker profile score 
The extreme case of big motivation determines the 
surface presented in figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Attacker profile score in care of big motivation 
If resources are big, like in the case of cyber 
warrior knowledge has the influence on attacker score 
as presented in figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. The cyber warrior - attacker profile score 
The above simulation results made in MATLAB 
show the importance of knowledge factor in 
establishing the scores associated with attacker profile. 
The influence of resources is less important than 
knowledge as seen from figure 12 (motivation 
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medium, knowledge big). This is the case of 
disgruntled employee (small resources) and industrial 
spy (big resources). 
 
Figure 12. Saturation in case of disgruntled employee  
and industrial spy 
IV. MODELLING THE ATTACK SUCCESS RATE 
After modeling the attacker profile, the authors 
propose a fuzzy model for the attack success rate.  
We define the attack success rate as the ability of 
the attacker to interrupt the functioning of the target 
system. This rate is mostly influenced by four 
parameters: the attacker profile score previously 
established, the system protection level, the system 
vulnerabilities and the restore cost.  
The system protection level is an intrinsic system 
characteristic related to the number and the quality of 
countermeasures taken in order to secure the system.   
The system vulnerabilities indicator shows the 
level of the known vulnerabilities that are not 
mitigated by the countermeasures already taken. 
The restore cost is an important factor that 
indicates both the time and the financial resources 
needed to re-establish the correct system functioning 
in case of an attack. 
The proposed inputs parameters are presented in 
table 3. 
TABLE III.  INPUTS DESCRIPTION 
Input  
Membership functions 
Small Medium Big 
Attacker 
profile 
trimf trimf trimf 
[-0.5 0 0.5] [0 0.5 1] [0.5 1 1.5] 
Protection 
level 
trimf trimf trimf 
[-0.4 0 0.3] [0.1 0.4 0.7] [0.4 1 1.4] 
Vulnerabiliti
es 
trimf trimf trimf 
[-0.4 0 0.4] [0.1 0.5 0.8] [0.6 1 1.4] 
Restore cost trimf trimf trimf [-0.4 0 0.4] [0.1 0.5 0.8] [0.7 1 1.4] 
 
Each input is described by three membership 
function with triangular shape. This yields to 81 fuzzy 
rules Mamdami type. The output (successrate) has 5 
associated membership functions like in figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Output successrate representation 
The fuzzy rules corresponding to the four inputs 
describe cyber attack pattern in industrial control 
systems. In Table 4 is presented a selection of the 81 
resulted rules (VS-very small, S-small, M-medium, B-
big, VB-very big). 
TABLE IV.  SELECTION OF PROPOSED FUZZY RULES 
No. 
Main active rule 
Attacker 
Profile 
System 
protection 
System 
vulnerabilities 
Restore 
cost 
Success 
rate 
1 S S S S VS 
2 S S S M S 
6 S S M B M 
10 S M S S VS 
15 S M M B S 
20 S B S M VS 
27 S B B B S 
35 M S B M B 
40 M M M S S 
45 M M B B B 
60 B S M B VB 
70 B M B S B 
81 B B B B VB 
 
The rules are constructed according to authors’ 
experience. For example, rule 27 represents a less 
likely to happen attack, upon a highly protected target 
with big restore costs by an unskilled attacker so the 
success rate is small. Rule 60 specify a very successful 
attack run by an expert attacker with major impact, 
due to big restore costs. 
The success rate is directly proportional with 
attacker’s profile score and the restore cost and 
decreases with the protection degree, as presented in 
figure 14. 
The relation between system protection degree and 
attack success rate, for some attacker profiles or attack 
scenarios will be discussed in a future work. 
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Figure 14. The case of medium system vulnerabilities  
and big restore costs 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The control systems security is a challenging 
research topic. Modelling and estimating the attacker 
types and attack success rate is a concern of the 
academic and industrial communities. In this paper the 
authors use a fuzzy inference approach to introduce a 
new concept – the attacker profile score.  
This score indicate how skilled is an attacker based 
on three attributes: knowledge, technical resources and 
motivation. Taking into account the authors practical 
experience in the security field and the data from 
literature some well-established attacker profiles were 
analyzed. 
In the last part of the paper a fuzzy inference 
system for assessing the attack success rate is 
presented.  This rate is influenced by four parameters: 
the attacker profile score previously established, the 
system protection level, the system vulnerabilities and 
the restore cost. It shows clearly that the success rate is 
directly proportional with attacker’s profile score and 
the restore cost and decreases with the protection 
degree. 
Further research should be done in estimating the 
security risks associated of a specific control system 
tacking into account the attacker profile score and the 
attack success rate defined in this paper. There is also 
needed a context-aware approach of security, that take 
into consideration the changes in time of motivation 
and vulnerabilities in order to implement dynamic 
countermeasures in control system, without affecting 
their performances and objectives. 
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